In this article, we propose a new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. The scheme is based on the ElGamal's public key cryptosystem. Our scheme does not require a system to maintain a password table for verifying the legitimacy of the login users. In addition, our scheme can withstand message replaying attack.
INTRODUCTION
In 1981, Lamport [5] proposed a remote password authentication scheme with insecure communication. His scheme can withstand replaying attacks, but it needs a password table for verifying the legitimacy of the login users. This scheme may cause problem if intruders can modify the passwords stored in the password table of the system. Later, Hwang et al. [2] proposed an authentication scheme using smart cards. Their scheme is based on the Shamir's ID-based signature scheme. In 1995, Wu proposed an efficient remote login authentication scheme [8] which is based on simple geometric properties on the Euclidean plane. Unfortunately, the scheme is weakness in the security [4] .
In this article, we propose a new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. The scheme is based on ElGamal public key cryptosystem [1, 3] . The new scheme not only can withstand against message replaying attacks but can perform remote user authentication without using a password table. Before describing the proposed scheme, we first briefly review the ElGamal public key scheme as follows.
ELGAMAL'S PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
There are two public parameters, P and g, in the ElGamal public key cryptosystem. P is a large prime number and (P − 1) has a large prime factor; g is the primitive element in Galois field GF (P ) [6, 7] . Each user U i has a secret key x i (x i ∈ [1, P − 2]) and a public key y i , where y i = g xi mod P . If user A wants to send a message M to user B. User A selects a random number r (r ∈ [1, P − 1]) and calculates
User A then uses the public key y b of user B and the random number r to encipher the message M as follows:
0 Responsible for correspondence.
1 right head 2 The order pair (C 1 , C 2 ) is transmitted to user B and the random number r is kept secret by user A. User B can decipher (C 1 , C 2 ) to get the plain-text M as follows:
3 OUR SCHEME
The new remote user authentication scheme can be divided into three phases: the registration phase, the login phase, and the authentication phase. Before accessing a remote system, a new user should submit his/her identity to the system in the registration phase. The system (registration center) will give the new user a smart card and a password through a secure channel. When a legal user wants to login the computer system, he/she has to insert his/her smart card into the login device and keys in his/her identity and password.
Registration phase: Suppose that a new user U i submits his ID i to the system for registration. The system calculates the password P W i for the user U i as follows:
where x s is a secret key maintained by the system. The registration center issues a smart card, which contains the public parameters (f, P ), where f is a one-way function. The registration center is also delivered P W i to the user through a secure channel. The smart cards possessed by all users will contain the same data and functions, i.e., (f, P ).
Login phase: Upon login, U i attaches his smart card to his input device. Then he keys in his ID i and the password P W i to the device. The smart card will perform the following operations:
1. Generate a random number r.
Compute
, where T is the current date and time of the input device. And ⊕ denotes an exclusive operation.
6. Send a message C = (ID i , C 1 , C 2 , T ) to the remote system.
Authentication phase: After receiving the authentication message C, the system authenticate the login user using the following steps. Suppose that the system receives the message C sent from the user U i at T ′ , where T ′ is the current date and time of the system.
1. Test the validity of ID i . If the format of ID i is incorrect, then the system rejects the login request.
Test the time interval between T and T
where ∆T denotes the expected legal time interval for transmission delay, then the system rejects the login request.
, then the system accepts the login request. Otherwise, it rejects the login request.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Because the scheme is based on the ElGamal public key scheme, it is very difficult for the user U i to compute the secret key of the system from the equation P W i = (ID i ) xs mod P . Also it is difficult for an intruder to obtain the system generated random number r directly from the equation C 1 = (ID i ) r mod P of step 2 in the login phase. The difficulty relies on the complexity of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields [1] .
In order to pass the test of step 2 in the authentication phase, the intruder must change T into a new time T * such that (T ′′ − T * ) ≤ ∆T where T ′′ is the time when the system receives the illegal login message. Once T is changed, the test of step 3 in the authentication phase is failure unless either t or C 2 has been changed accordingly. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure to withstand the replaying attack. 
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a remote user authentication scheme without using a password file or a verification table. Our scheme can withstand the attack of replaying a previously intercepted login request message. The security of the scheme relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields.
